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THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: STILL
FUNCTIONAL AFTER ALL THESE YEARS?
Steven L Friedland*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although there have been only fourteen impeachment trials since
the ratification of the United States Constitution,1 in recent years federal judges have been impeached with greater frequency. One of the
consequences of the .increased incidence of such impeachment proceedings has been a closer scrutiny of the impeachment process in the political and academic arenas.' One particular source of scrutiny has been
* Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. B.A., State University of
New York at Binghamton, 1978; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1981. The author wishes to express
his thanks and appreciation to Shirley DeLuna, Brenda Pagliaro, Leslie Deckelbaum, and Betty
Brunyon for their useful suggestions and their able assistance in the drafts of this article.
1. Stewart, Impeachment By Ignorance, A.B.A.J., June, 1990 at 55; CONG. RES. SERV.,
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, IMPEACHMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, No. 88-637A (Sept. 1988). The fourteen impeachment trials have included

William Blount, United States Senator from Tennessee, whose impeachment proceedings lasted
from 1797 through 1799; John Pickering, judge for the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, who was impeached from 1803 through 1804; Samuel Chase, Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, who was impeached from 1804 to 1805; James Peck,
district judge for the United States District Court for the District of Missouri, who was impeached from 1826 through 1831; West Humphreys, Judge for the United States District Court for
the District of Tennessee, who was. impeached in 1862; Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States, whose impeachment proceedings occurred in 1867 through 1868; William Belknap, Secretary of War, who was subjected to impeachment proceedings in 1876; Charles Swain, a district
court judge for the Northern District of Florida who was impeached from 1903 through 1905;
Robert Archbald, circuit judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit who was serving as a judge on the United States Commerce Court and was impeached from
1912 through 1913; George English, judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Illinois, whose impeachment lasted from 1925 through 1926; Harold Louderback, a
judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, who was impeached from 1932 through 1933; Halstead Ritter, judge for the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, who was impeached in 1936. J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE:
AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH Crimes and Misdemeanors in the Federal Courts
221-48 (1963). Harry E. Claiborne, district judge for the District of Nevada, was impeached in
1986. Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. Judge Alcee Hastings, district judge for the Southern District of Florida, was impeached in 1989. See Stewart, supra, at 52-54.
2. This trend was most recently exhibited in the 1989 impeachment of federal judge Alcee
L. Hastings. Prior to Judge Hastings' impeachment, Judge Harry Claiborne of the District of
Nevada was removed by impeachment. Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. Judge Walter
Nixon of the Southern District of Mississippi was convicted on felony charges in 1986 and impeached in the summer of 1989. Judge Robert Aguilar of California was tried in 1990 on criminal
charges and, after a hung jury, will likely be retried. Depending on the outcome of the retrial, he
too may be subject to impeachment. J. BORKIN, supra note 1, at 199-244.
3. Note, In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH. L.
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the Congress.
Congress has several apparent reasons for re-examining the process. Congress could spend the considerable time required to conduct
impeachment proceedings on other important matters. The media attention that follows impeachments has made the issue a matter of public concern, and augments the distractions from other congressional duties. For these reasons, several proposals have been made to alter the
existing impeachment process.4 One of these proposals is currently
before a Senate subcommittee.5
The 1989 impeachment of Judge Alcee L. Hastings is perhaps the
best illustration of the various issues associated with the impeachment
process. The Hastings case contains several procedural and substantive
singularities that distinguish it from previous cases and offers considerable insight into the way the impeachment process works. The impeachment issues raised by the Hastings case include the effect on impeachment proceedings of a prior jury acquittal, the propriety of the
initiation of charges by fellow judges, and, although Hastings was not
the first to confront this question, whether a Senate impeachment trial
may occur by subcommittee.
This article examines some of the issues relating to the impeachment process using the Hastings case as a focal point. In particular, the
article focuses on the congressional response to the growing perception
that the cumbersome impeachment process needs revision. The article
culminates with a review of Senate Bill 1851, a proposal to modify the
impeachment process which is currently under consideration by the
Senate Courts and Administrative Practice Subcommittee.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Impeachment of Judge Hastings

The origin of the impeachment of then Federal District Court
Judge Alcee Hastings of the Southern District of Florida can be traced
to the October, 1981 arrest of William Borders. Borders, a District of
Columbia attorney and friend of Hastings, was charged with conspiring
with Hastings to accept a bribe regarding a case pending sentencing in
Hastings' court. 6 Hastings was subsequently indicted on charges of conREV. 420, 422 (1987).
4. Id. at 428 n.50.
5. See S. 1851, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S15,268 (1989).
6. The case before Judge Hastings involved two brothers, Thomas and Frank Romano, who
had been convicted of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act. United States v. Romano, 523 F. Supp. 1209, 1209-10 (S.D. Fla. 1981). On May 4, 1981,
prior to the sentencing of the Romanos, Judge Hastings entered an order in the case requiring
that the Romanos forfeit property valued at $1,162,016. Id. at 1210-11. The alleged conspiracy
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spiracy to accept a bribe. He was tried by a jury and acquitted of all
criminal charges in February, 1983." However, the acquittal proved to
be a short-lived victory.
In March, 1983, approximately one month after Hastings' acquittal, two other federal judges charged Hastings with misconduct in office.8 Although the complaint against Hastings included multiple
charges, it primarily concerned the alleged conspiracy, between Hastings and Borders, as well as the alleged false statements Hastings
made under oath during his trial. 9
The charges against Judge Hastings were made pursuant to the
Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980.10 The Act permitted federal judges to initiate complaints and
recommend impeachment to the House of Representatives. At each
stage of the Judicial Council's proceedings, the members of the decision-making body voted to recommend that Hastings be impeached."
Congress agreed with the conclusions reached by the Judicial Council,
and the impeachment process culminated with Hastings' conviction by'
the Senate in October, 1989.12
B.

The Unusual Nature of the Hastings Case

The Hastings case was unusual for several reasons. The culmination of the inquiry into Hastings' conduct in an impeachment trial was
itself uncommon." Historically, there have been fourteen impeachment
trials involving federal officers since the adoption of the United States
Constitution in 1787.14 Less than half of those trials resulted in
convictions.' 6

between William Borders and Hastings involved a reduction in the amount to be forfeited. See
generally Katz, Double Jeopardy: The Endless Trial Of Judge Alcee Hastings, 8 REGARDIE'S,
Apr., 1988 at 204-08, 262-63.
7. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of United States, 593 F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (1984).
8. Id. The federal judges were members of the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council. Based
upon their written charges, then chief judge of the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council, Judge John
Godbold, forwarded the charges for further investigation to the Judicial Council. Id. at 1377.
9. Id.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) (1988). This act also permits the judges to discipline and admonish the other members of the judiciary. See id. § 37 & (c)(6)(B).
11. The Judicial Conference of the United States unanimously recommended impeachment,
and the House voted 413 to 3 in August, 1988 to impeach. Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1988, at Al.
12. Stewart, supra note 1, at 53-55.
13. There have been only fourteen impeachment trials in the entire history of the United
States. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 55.
14. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
15. See Note, supra note 3, at 427 nn.44-45. Those impeachment proceedings ending in
convictions included Judge Pickering, district judge for the District of New Hampshire; Judge
Humphreys, of the United States District Court for the District of Tennessee; Judge Archbald,
United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals; Judge Ritter, judge for the
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The impeachment of a sitting federal judge was even more of a
historical rarity. Although Hastings was not the first sitting judge to be
impeached, he was the first to be charged with committing a crime

while exercising his judicial responsibilities.16 Judge Harry E. Clai-

borne of the District of Nevada also was a sitting judge when he was
impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate in 1986 after having been previously convicted on criminal felony charges." Judge Has-

tings, however, had not been previously convicted of a crime. To the

contrary, he had been acquitted of all criminal charges arising from

substantially the same subject matter on which his impeachment was

based."8
The Hastings impeachment followed Claiborne by utilizing a rule
permitting a committee of Senators to hear the full evidence at an impeachment trial.19 At Hastings' trial, only twelve Senators heard all of

the evidence. Yet, the entire Senate was responsible for deciding
whether to impeach." Furthermore, the recommendation of impeach-

ment was initiated by the Judicial Conference of the United States, a
group composed of Hastings' judicial brethren. The recommendation
by the group was the first of its kind. 2
III.

ANALYSIS

The Hastings case raises a number of provocative legal issues, four
of which are discussed below. The first issue is whether the double

jeopardy prohibition protects a federal judge from being impeached following a criminal acquittal. The second issue is whether an impeachment in the Congress may only follow a criminal prosecution on the
same subject matter or whether it may precede it. The third issue involves the propriety and legality of using the federal judiciary to initi-

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. J. BORKIN, supra note 1, at
199-244. Also ending in a conviction was the impeachment of Judge Claiborne of the District of
Nevada. Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3. The impeachment of Judge Hastings of the
Southern District of Florida ended in a conviction as well. Stewart, supra note 1, at 52-54.
16. Katz, supra note 6, at 205. Actually, Judge Otto Kerner, Jr. of the Seventh CircuitCourt of Appeals was prosecuted while sitting as a federal judge. The crimes Judge Kerner was
charged with, however, related to matters that took place prior to his becoming a judge. See
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); see also Note,
supra note 3, at 422 n.18.
17. Judge Claiborne was convicted of tax fraud and sentenced to two years in an Alabama
Federal Penitentiary. See Note, supra note 3, at 420.
18. Judge Hastings was acquitted on criminal charges, including conspiracy to take a bribe,
in February, 1983. He was tried separately from his alleged co-conspirator, attorney William Borders, who was convicted of conspiracy to accept a bribe. Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1989, at A5.
19. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 52-54.
20. Id. at 52.
21. See Note, supra note 3, at 422 n.18.
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ate impeachments against other federal judges. The fourth issue concerns the legitimacy of using a Senate subcommittee to hear
impeachment evidence instead of the entire Senate.
A.

Double Jeopardy

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment states: "[n]or
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb ... *"22 While it may appear that this clause
prohibits a retrial on impeachment charges, it appears fairly settled
that the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the impeachment of a
judge after an acquittal on criminal charges concerning the same subject matter does not constitute double jeopardy. 3
When James Madison first proposed the double jeopardy provision
of the fifth amendment on June 8, 1789, he suggested that the clause
include the prohibition of re-trial of the same offense "except in cases
of impeachment." ' This addition did not survive the amendment.
Madison's reference to impeachment shows that his original intent was
to preclude only additional criminal proceedings from re-trial. Subsequent interpretations of the double jeopardy clause have reaffirmed this
5
view.1
Yet it can be argued that impeachment is similar to and should be
included in the category of "criminal proceedings," for which re-trial is
prohibited. The deletion of Madison's "except in cases of impeachment" language suggests that impeachment was intended by the framers to be included in the double jeopardy prohibition. Moreover, the
Constitution states that " [t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury,"2 6 thereby grouping impeachment proceedings with criminal matters. Furthermore, the language used in the
Constitution permits impeachment for "Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors, ' ' 27 all of which are criminal offenses. Finally, an impeached federal officer is pronounced "convicted," which is
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. See Hastings v. United States Senate, Impeachment Trial Comm. 716 F. Supp. 38, 4142 (D.D.C. 1989); see also United States v. Isaacs, 493 F. 2d 1124, 1142 (7th Cir. 1979).
24. See CONG. RES. SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS, THE POSSIBLE INTERACTION BETWEEN
THE IMPEACHMENT

PROCESS AND THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE, No. 89-112A, 6 (Feb. 15,
1989) (hereinafter REPORT FOR CONGRESS).
25. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
("The constitutional prohibition against 'double jeopardy' was designed to protect an individual
from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged
offense.").
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.3.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Article II, § 4 states that "[tihe President, Vice President and
all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Id.
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the same term used to describe the recipient of a guilty verdict in a
criminal trial.
Nonetheless, despite these arguments based on the Framers' likely
intent, it is generally believed that impeachment proceedings are essen2
tially remedial in nature, and therefore civil. " Impeachments do not
generally have any criminal or punitive consequences; instead, the im29
peached official is removed from office. In addition, while impeachment proceedings may be based upon what otherwise could be prosecuted as criminal acts, impeachment is also appropriate for noncriminal misconduct in office that breaches the public's trust. For example, a judge may be impeached and convicted for incompetently presiding over a case.30 Thus, the lack of a criminal act requirement for
impeachment further suggests that the purpose of impeachment is different than that of a criminal trial. Consequently, impeachment should
not be prohibited after a criminal prosecution results in an acquittal
regarding the same subject matter.
B. Impeachment Following Criminal Proceedings
The impeachment of a federal judge following a criminal proceeding can create more than an awkward, untenable situation. It may recase, the initiasult in a major constitutional dilemma. In the Hastings
1 after his acquittal
months
one
only
proceedings
tion of impeachment
created the appearance that the impeachment proceedings were retaliatory. The impeachment of Judge Harry Claiborne after his conviction,
32
however, created a more serious problem. Even after Claiborne had
been sentenced and had begun serving a prison term for his criminal
3
conviction, he technically remained a sitting federal judge. Claiborne's refusal to resign fueled the absurd3 possibility that Judge Claiborne might hear cases from behind bars. "
28. REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 24, at 17-18.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Article II, § 4 states that upon impeachment a civil officer
"shall be removed from Office." Id.
30. See J. BORKIN, supra note 1, at 199-200, 243-44. Judge Ritter of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida was impeached in 1936 for improperly handling a case before him. Id.
31. Hastings was acquitted on criminal charges in February, 1983, and the initial Judicial
Conference complaint about his conduct involving the alleged conspiracy, as well as statements he
made at trial, was initiated in March, 1983. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of United States, 593
F. Supp. 1371, 1376 (1984).
32. See Note, supra note 3, at 420.
33. Claiborne remained a judge until he was convicted by the Senate on October 9, 1986,
almost six months after having been convicted of felony charges. See Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1986,
at A14, col. 1; see also Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1986, at Al, col. 3.
34. In the appeal of the Claiborne decision, Judge Kosinsky stated that it would be possible
to permit the prison inmate to continue to perform some judicial functions. United States v. Clai-
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The criminal prosecution and imprisonment of a federal judge
prior to impeachment creates the dilemma of what to do with an incapacitated but still-sitting judge. It may be argued that a federal judge
who has been convicted and imprisoned on felony charges is not fit to
continue serving as a federal judge. However, impeachment is the only
constitutional mechanism for the removal of federal judges who are
granted life-tenure. Federal judges may remain in office as long as they
maintain "good behavior." ' Thus, prosecution prior to impeachment
effectively achieves what the Constitution does not permit the Congress
or the President to do--remove a federal judge from office without impeachment proceedings. The short answer to this problem, of course,
would be to reintroduce the longstanding practice of impeachment
prior to criminal prosecution. Otherwise, the Claiborne dilemma may
recur.
C.

Impeachment Initiated by the Judiciary

Another troubling issue raised in the Hastings case is the use of
the judiciary to recommend impeachment to the House of Representa-

tives.36 In addition to the awkwardness created by judges initiating the
impeachment process of one of their own, the question has been raised
as to whether the use of the judiciary constitutes an improper delegation of congressional power.3 7 Until recently, it had been the common
practice for a prosecutor, the Attorney General of the United States, or
the state legislature to recommend to the House of Representatives that

impeachment proceedings be initiated. 8

The key question relating to the use of judges to institute impeach-

ment complaints is whether the independence of the federal judiciary,
borne, 790 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1986). Judge Kosinsky also said that:
[t]he spectacle of a federal judge serving jail time between sittings is not materially more
grotesque than having a judge resume judicial duties after serving a prison sentence. Our
sense of discomfort with either of these scenarios stems from the fact that Congress has not
chosen to remove Judge Claiborne through the impeachment process.
Id. at 1360 n.4.
35. Article III, § I of the U.S. Constitution states that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .
U.S. CONST.art. III,§
1.
36. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28
U.S.C. § 372(c)(8) (1988). The procedure by which the Judicial Conference may recommend
impeachment first requires a Circuit Judicial Council Investigating Committee to certify to that
Conference that impeachment is appropriate. The Conference then has to agree with that conclusion and certify its conclusion to the entire House of Representatives. The Judicial Conference,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988), is charged with overseeing the Federal Judiciary, and the
rules and procedures by which it operates. Id.
37. The delegation doctrine is a component of the separation of powers requirement. The
Constitution grants Congress the sole power to impeach. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.6.
38. See Note, supra note 3, at 427; see also J. BORKIN, supra note 1, at 44.
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so important to the doctrine of the separation of powers, would be compromised by such a system. Even if Congress makes the decision to
impeach, there still may be an appearance of improper delegation when
the legislative branch does not perform the initial investigation. The
potential unconstitutionality increases if the use of the Judicial Conference to recommend impeachment in effect requires Congress to act.
Challenges to this procedural framework have been rebuffed to date."'
However, the validity of this process should be reviewed in court, or by
the legislators who created it.
D.

Impeachment Trial By Senate Subcommittee

The use of a subcommittee to hear the evidence in an impeachment trial, instead of the entire Senate, is a relatively recent procedural
development. The Senate subcommittee was first used in the 1986 im4
peachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne. " The rules authorizing this

procedure had been in existence for several years.4 ' Yet the rules had

not been used42 prior to the Claiborne case, and were modified for Clai-

borne's trial.

The use of a Senate subcommittee possesses the virtue of being
expeditious,4 a but appears potentially unconstitutional. The underlying
premises of the Constitution are not shaped solely or even significantly
by expediency." In fact, the Constitution often requires slow, delibera-

tive decision making. For example, the Constitution requires that bills

be presented to both houses for approval prior to being presented to the

President,45 and that an impeachment conviction have the support of
two-thirds of the Senate."
39. See generally McConnell, Reflections on the Senate's Role in the Judicial Impeachment Process and Proposalsfor Change, 76 Ky. L.J. 739, 752-60 (1987); Note, In Defense of the
Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard, 86 MICH. L. REV. 420, 446-54 (1987).
40. See Note, supra note 3, at 427. See also J. BORKIN, supra note 1, at 44.
41. The rules are known as the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting
on an Impeachment Trial. See S. Doc. No. 33, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986).
42. Stewart, supra note 1, at 52.
43. As Senator Howell Heflin stated, "A jury of 100 is totally unworkable," referring to
having the entire Senate try cases of impeachment. Lauter, Will Claiborne's Impeachment Spur
Overhaul of Process?, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 8, col. 1.
44. Note, supra note 3, at 423 (Impeachment standards are designed to be cumbersome to
protect the judiciary.).
45. The presentment clause, as it is known, requires that all bills be approved by both
houses of Congress and then presented to the President of the United States for approval. U.S.
CoN sT. art. I, § 7, cl.3. The clause states in pertinent part that "[e]very Order, Resolution, or
Vote, to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
. . . shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take
Effect, shall be approved by him . . . " Id.
46. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl.6. "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President
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The strict requirements for the removal of federal judges safeguard the independence of the federal judiciary from the other
branches of government."' The importance of judicial independence is
reflected in various Constitutional requirements such as the life tenure
afforded to federal judges. 48 In addition the impeachment process involves separate hearings in both the House and Senate, and requires
two-thirds of the Senators present to vote for conviction. These mechanisms indicate that the Constitution is intentionally highly protective of
the judiciary. If a Senate subcommittee compromises this protection
simply to improve the efficiency of a slow and deliberate component of
constitutional machinery, the use of the subcommittee would appear to
directly clash with the intent of the Framers. Furthermore, the use of
the subcommittee may transform the extraordinary nature of an important constitutional proceeding into the equivalent of ordinary Congressional committee work.
The use of a subcommittee to hear the evidence also may sacrifice
the accuracy of the proceeding. In the Hastings, Claiborne,and Nixon
impeachment proceedings, the subcommittee members who heard all
the evidence invariably voted to convict less often than non-subcommittee members.4 9 Whether this differential reflects on the fairness of the
proceeding cannot be positively gainsaid from the data.50 At the very
least, direct exposure to the evidence in an impeachment trial should
have a perceptible impact on the receiving Senators, an impact that
may likely be sufficient to influence the outcome of the proceeding. One
commentator has alleged that because of this impact, a "trial by committee cheats the accused of a fair trial." 1
Nevertheless, an impeachment proceeding and trial place great
pressure upon the Senate to be expeditious. 2 During the time devoted
.to impeachment, important affairs of the State may be left
unattended.5 3
The resolution is not obvious. To illustrate, the language of the
Constitution is not dispositive. The Constitution states only that "[t]he

of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no Person shall be convicted
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present." Id.
47. Note, supra note 3, at 439.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
49. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 54.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1986, at A16, col. 3; Nunn, Judicial Tenure, 54 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 29, 31 (1977). See also Note, supra note 3, at 421.
53. As one commentator has noted, "[tihe Claiborne trial took seven days, Hastings took 18
trial days, and Nixon consumed four trial days, for an average trial length of 10 days." Stewart,
supra note I, at 55.
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Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments."" There is
no language specifying whether the entire Senate must receive all of
the evidence. If the impeachment proceeding is treated as the
equivalent of a regular criminal proceeding, the language should be
construed in favor of the defendant under the principle of strict construction. 5 Even if it is not deemed to be the equivalent of a criminal
case, the potential loss resulting from an impeachment, compounded by
the infrequency of its use, indicates that the constitutional language
should be construed to promote fairness to the defendant in the course
of the proceedings.56 Even in civil cases, jurors cannot be absent during
the proceedings. Rather, alternates are chosen to protect against the
possibility of juror absence. Also, the fact that a criminal conviction
has already been rendered in these recent impeachment proceedings
suggests that even greater diligence should be taken to avoid a rush to
judgment. Finally, a House of Representatives vote for impeachment is
that should not be used as a proxy for a de
an independent question
57
trial.
novo Senate
The express delegation of the impeachment process to Congress is
indicative of its importance to the framework of the Constitution. In
light of its importance to the Constitutional structure as well as to the
individual defendant, the entire Senate should hear all the evidence and
decide as a governing body. Due process concerns should not allow the
impeachment of a sitting federal judge to be recast as a secondary matter by a delegation to a subcommittee.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE-S. 1851
The future of the impeachment process is being reviewed by Congress. The responses by Congress may prove instrumental in reaching
an accommodation between the constitutional safeguards of the impeachment process and the need for expediency in the hearings. In particular, the United States Senate is considering S. 1851, a bill which
would alter current impeachment practices. 8 The bill, called the "JudiCONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
55. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
56. As one commentator noted, "Surely, when we 'doom to honor or to infamy the most
confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community' we must be at least as careful to provide a fair hearing and informed jurors." Stewart, supra note 1, at 55.
57. The trial by subcommittee issue will certainly become more volatile if the House of
Representatives tries to streamline its impeachment procedures as well. Several members of Congress have proposed constitutional amendments that would modify the existing procedures. For
example, members of the subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee
discussed several proposed amendments in an April 1987 hearing. CONG. RES. SERV., REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, AN ANALYSIS OF S.J. RES. 113, A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATING
TO THE REMOVAL OF FEDERAL JUDGES, No. 87-764A (Sept. 14, 1987).
58. S. 1851 in pertinent part states:

54. U.S.
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cial Integrity and Independence Act of 1989," is presently in the Senate Judiciary Committee and has been referred for review to the
Courts and Administrative Practice Subcommittee.6 °
This bill, if passed, would streamline the existing impeachment
mechanism. Its purpose is "[t]o supplement the impeachment remedy
for removing federal judges for misbehavior." 1 The bill relies on a review by federal judges who may decide that the accused judge's behavior warrants removal. The bill provides for a removal process that appears to be totally independent of the current impeachment process.62
While the bill serves to free up the Senate as well as the House
from lengthy time-consuming impeachment proceedings, it also appears
to circumvent the protective shield that the existing impeachment
mechanism provides for judges. In addition, the bill proposes the use of
federal judges to police their own. Using the judiciary is unwise and
may be attacked on several grounds. First, it is hard to imagine how
federal judges, under general recusal rules, would not have some conflict of interest in determining the fate of another federal judge, particularly one in the same circuit. For example, a three-judge panel might
SEC. 2. PETITION.
The attorney general is authorized, in his discretion, to petition the Chief Justice of
the United States to appoint 3 judges within the Federal judiciary to determine whether a
Federal judge (other than the Chief Justice of the United States or an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States) has engaged in conduct constituting a felony
under the laws of the United States, and should be removed from office for lack of good
behavior. The Chief Justice shall make the requested appointments within 30 days after
receipt of the petition.
SEC. 3. CIVIL ACTION.
After appointment of the 3-judge court under section 2, the Attorney General, within
thirty days after receiving notification of such appointments from the Chief Justice, may
file a civil action to remove the accused judge before the 3-judge court in conformity with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, consistent with this Act.
SEC. 4. REMOVAL.
A Federal judge is removable under this Act only by the unanimous vote of the 3judge court that he has engaged in conduct constituting felony under the laws of the
United States and should be removed from office for lack of good behavior. The decision of
the 3-judge court shall be final and unreviewable in any other judicial forum.
SEC. 5. PROCEEDINGS ABATE.
Any civil removal action filed under section 3 shall be permanently ended if, at any
time during its pendency, the House of Representatives votes an article of impeachment
against the accused judge.
SEC. 6. NOT APPLICABLE TO JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
The civil removal powers of this Act are niot applicable to Justices of the United States
Supreme Court.
S.1851, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S15,268 (1989).
59. Id. at S15,268, § 1.
60. The bill was referred on December I1,
1989. Id.
61.

Id.

62. Id. at S15,268, §§ 2-6.
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have to assess whether a federal judge had committed a felony after a
jury had concluded that he had not. The three-judge panel would have
to decide what weight or deference it should give to the jury's findings,
and whether it should use the same standard of proof, which is beyond
a reasonable doubt. Also, the three-judge panel would have to exclude
evidence not properly before it.
The bill also provides that the decision of the three-judge panel
"shall be final and unreviewable in any other judicial forum." 3 While
this rule eliminates the potential for endless litigation and review," the
complete insulation of the new tribunal's decision is contrary to common judicial principles and may be a violation of due process. The
three-judge panel's decision may be based on an error of fact, law, or
other improper prejudice. The significance of the panel's decision to
continuing judicial independence mandates some form of review, even
if it is assumed that the rest of the bill is constitutional.
V.

CONCLUSION

The impeachment process has remained virtually unchanged for
more than two hundred years. While the impeachment device is rarely
used, the considerable amount of time it requires of Congress has created calls for change. Attempts by Congress to streamline the process
undermine the extraordinary nature of the impeachment remedy, and
may violate principles of separation of powers and the independence of
the judiciary. -Thus, while a streamlined process is very appealing to
those who may have to participate in it, and delegation appears to be a
preferable alternative, these measures do not appear to comply with
fundamental notions of due process.
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